In this response to Wyble and Chen's (in press) commentary on attribute amnesia, we hope to achieve several goals. First, we clarify how our view diverges from that described by Wyble and Chen. We argue that because the surprise memory test is disruptive, it is an insensitive tool for measuring the persistence of recently attended target attributes in memory. Second, we identify points of agreement between our view and that of Wyble and Chen. Like them, we believe that the strength of a mental representation is a critical factor in determining whether the representation persists long enough to be used in a surprise recognition task. We also agree that consolidation is one means of strengthening this representation. Finally, we suggest questions that should be addressed to clarify the factors that determine whether attended information can be reported in a surprise memory test.
recognition tests are often insensitive to the presence of weaker, or implicit, memory representations (Schacter & Graf, 1986) .
To address these concerns we asked whether priming measures would reveal memory for the attributes that were used to define targets. Using Chen and Wyble (2015) 's task in which participants localized a target digit defined by its parity, we showed that participants performed at chance on the surprise memory trial in identifying the target digit. However, priming measures indicated that the target's identity persisted in memory longer than the surprise memory test might have suggested: Participants were more accurate and faster when the current trial's target was the same as the preceding trial's target. This inter-trial priming demonstrated that a representation of the target's identity persisted beyond the end of the trial, long enough to influence performance on the next one. The target's location memory evidenced similar results. Participants showed strong inter-trial priming for the target's location. Though their memory for the target's location was above chance on the surprise test, it was significantly lower on the surprise trial than on post-surprise trials. Based on these findings, we concluded that "a failure to accurately report an attribute on the surprise trials does not imply that the information is completely absent from memory" (pp. 1336).
In their commentary, Wyble and Chen (in press ) discussed these findings in the context of their more recent work on attribute amnesia. While acknowledging that priming is a useful tool to assess attribute memory, Wyble and Chen suggest that the surprise memory test is not necessarily inferior. They report that surprise test response times were similar in experiments where they found attribute amnesia (Chen & Wyble, 2016, Experiment 3a) and in experiments where they did not (Chen & Wyble, 2016, Experiment 3c) . Thus, participants were capable of accurately responding to the surprise memory test, and that the amount of time that it took them to do so was a poor indicator of whether they were able to report the attribute. However, the data came from a single trial for each participant, raising concerns about the power to detect a difference if it truly exists. Moreover, a lack of an RT difference across experiments is not strong evidence against the claim that the surprise memory test was disruptive. The surprise memory test could disrupt attribute memory through timeindependent processes (i.e., interference) as well as time-dependent processes (i.e. decay, cf. Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Brown, 2009; Ricker, Vergauwe, Hinrichs, Blume, & Cowan, 2015) . Because the surprise memory test presents a new situation, requires the participant to establish a new task set, and increases cognitive load, it is likely to increase interference in working memory (Liefooghe, Barrouillet, Vandierendonck, & Camos, 2008; Makovski, Shim, & Jiang, 2006; Makovski, Sussman, & Jiang, 2008; Sligte et al., 2008) . Interference can occur during time periods that are shorter than the observed surprise memory test response times (Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Brown, 2009; Ricker, Vergauwe, Hinrichs, Blume, & Cowan, 2015) .
How then, should attribute amnesia be assessed? In their commentary Wyble and Chen propose that attribute amnesia is indexed by poorer performance on the surprise trial relative to the post-surprise trials, rather than by chance performance on the surprise memory test. They point out that in post-surprise trials participants expect to have to report the attribute, but have no such expectation in surprise trials. While this is certainly true, it is nevertheless the case that, unlike postsurprise trials, the surprise memory test requires participants to learn and adjust to the new task demands. Thus, comparing performance on the surprise and post-surprise trials confounds the expectation to report the attribute with the effects of encountering those new task demands. What is measured is the nature of the representations that survive the memory test, and the conditions under which they are likely to do so. Consistent with this claim, we reported in Jiang et al. (2016) that the surprise memory procedure disrupts memory for both the attribute that participants expected to report and the attribute that defined the target. We suggested that the disruption is reduced on postsurprise trials, in part, because the same instructions, response mappings, and task demands are no longer novel or surprising. Contrasting performance on the surprise and post-surprise trials underestimates participants' memory for the target-defining attribute by including the effects of surprise, task set reconfiguration, and any number of unknown processes, regardless of how long it takes. Usage of this procedure may yield insights into when and what type of mental representation survives the surprise test. However, it cannot address the inherent gap between what the surprise memory test procedure measures and what existed in memory before the disruption set in.
Though the surprise test procedure is imperfect, it is a valuable tool for understanding the conditions under which memory will be robust enough to survive the procedure. Jiang et al. (2016) 's study was not designed to address this issue. Our explanation for the finding that "identity memory was less robust than location memory" was that "location continued to be relevant for the task but identity was no longer relevant." (pp. 1336). This statement describes the conditions under which we might expect memory for an attribute to survive the surprise memory test. It does not speculate about the mechanisms that might make that possible. Therefore, we consider the recent work of Chen and Wyble as advancing, rather than contradicting, our views about attribute amnesia. We agree that experimental manipulations that strengthen a memory representation should increase the likelihood that the representation persists despite significant interference. We further agree that mechanisms that strengthen these representations are more likely to be evoked when the task requires it (Makovski, Sussman, & Jiang, 2008; Maxcey-Richard & Hollingworth, 2012; Sligte, Scholte, & Lamme, 2008) . Chen and Wyble's recent work on attribute amnesia has provided valuable insight into the conditions under which attribute memory can be strengthened. This work shows that having to maintain a target attribute over a delay increases its chance of survival in the surprise test . This could be attributable to consolidation. Without additional data, however, Jiang et al. (2016) allow that other factors may also play a role. These factors could include attention to the information in working memory, the binding of features to objects, depth of processing, how the representation is used, and associating the stimuli to oneself.
One issue of debate raised in Wyble and Chen's commentary is the nature of memory for the recently attended target attribute. Two possibilities have been raised: (1) the mental representation of the target's identity was initially robust and then reverted to a weak state once identity became irrelevant; (2) the representation was never in a robust format (e.g., the representation was weakly encoded, never consolidated, or the features were not bound to items in working memory). It may be tempting to conclude that our original study supported the first possibility. For example, one might consider the priming data as evidence that participants had robust representations of the target's identity, and the surprise memory data as evidence that this representation was weakened. However, our data do not warrant such an interpretation. Jiang et al. (2016) did not assess the robustness of a target attribute's mental representation at two different time points: when the identity was relevant and after it became irrelevant. We left this issue open, proposing only that identity memory may have been less robust than location memory because it was no longer relevant, among other possible reasons.
We see several directions for future research on attribute amnesia. First, it is important to refine the methods that are used to assess mental representations of a recently attended attribute while minimizing disruptions from the memory test itself. Second, empirical research should continue tackling questions that examine factors which increase the robustness of attribute memory, both in the surprise test procedure and in less disruptive measures. For example, what does the requirement to maintain an attribute over a delay do? Does it change how the attribute was initially perceived, how much attention the attribute received during encoding, or the format of the representation that is maintained in working memory? Finally, at the theoretical level, Chen and Wyble's work on attribute amnesia along with their surprise test procedure opens new opportunities for understanding the role of expectation in visual cognition. So far the surprise procedure has been used in studies of attention (such as in inattentional blindness), yet clear differences exist between not expecting and not attending. The former taps into task set and the latter is more closely linked to selective processing. Distinguishing lack of attention from lack of expectation is an important theoretical step for guiding future cognitive and neuroscience research on visual cognition.
